Suggested category: Functional Post-Structural Ontological Minimalism, Emergent Structural Functionalism. Post-Structural Constructivism.

Functional Ontological Minimalism,

a post-metaphysical ontology that grounds structure in function and perception, not abstraction.

Structure of Conceptual Models

TODO: Clarify self-evident is pragmatic, not absolutely...
TODO: Clarify the 'real'
TODO: A model must have these categories... can be taken as absolute claim...

Identity

The thing

A structure of conceptual models is a conceptual model describing the general structure of all possible conceptual models.

It is an analytical, prescriptive, descriptive, fundamental structure that can be applied to express any conceptual model.

• It is fundamental in the sense it is the structure of any thing (including itself).
• It is a structure in the sense that, for a thing, it postulates three generative categories and the specific meaning of the relations between the content of each of them, and it postulates a fourth category, a derivational category, being the conclusive definition as based in the previous three categories.
• It is analytical in the sense that it identifies genrative units and places them in a suitable generative category, and then analyses the relations among units in the three categories,
• It is descriptive, in the sense a conceptual model is described by the derivational category.
• It is prescriptive, in the sense it is applied to structure the perceivers perception of a thing for exhaustive perceptual clarity, consequently influencing the perceivers choices.

Thus, a structure of conceptual models, when applied in constructing a conceptual model, organizes the perception for exhaustive perceptual clarity (including itself, thus).

The stcuture of conceptual models is a systematization of the innate human ability to analyze and categorize sensory impressions in order to create a conceptual models that become central in understanding sensory input as meaningful. The meaningful understanding that the resultant conceptual model embodies, is the kind of understanding that precedes choice and action of the perceiver, in a world where there are consequences.Structure of conceptual models is applied as a method of systematic analysis yielding exhausting perceptual clarity of the subject of its analysis. Thus, its applicatoin can be seen as a crystalization of the understanding of its subject.

Structure of conceptual models is based, not in absolute truth, but in absolutely relevant truth. The notation of absolute truth -- a single idea that everything must be acknowledged by -- is flipped upside down and brought from superior to inferior under the pragmatic excellence of structure of conceptual models. Simultaneously, it avoids the trap of endless relativity -- that no value is valuable as all value is relative -- and thus, remains exactly pragmatically excellent. It is based in absolutely relevant truth, meaning it is based in what is self-evidently the case as evident by the perceivers actions and environment. Detriment, misery, death, failure, choice, values, preference--these are all self-evident, in that, no matter the belief of the human, he or she acts accordingly. This ontology takes its basis truth, where truth is that which time and time again is affirmed by the actions of the human being. One of those truths, for example, is that a human being chooses one thing over antoher, that the consequences are different. Even a religious group claiming to know reality as opposite of what is stated here, will still exercise choice in selecting members for different roles for their religious community, and the selection process is optimized to promote the outcome of cohesion, administration and upholding of dogma. While their claim and belief may be opposite, their actions reflect the absolutely relevant truth stated here. The religious order, as the example, failing to aknowledge this, while still enacting this truth, is pragmatically inferior. This ontology does not state absolute truth, but states that this is absolutely relevant, as this is the condition of the human. It deals with things at the level of the human condition, rather than an arbitrary absolute truth that has to be assumed, and only is reasonable within its own system of logic. This ontology is not based on its own internal logic where the premisses have to be assumed and can not be sensed. Instead, it is based in what can be directly sensed, as for example that choice has consequence, and that certain choice yields prefered outcome, or, if that wouldnt be the case, the religious order would simply dissolve, just as the jumping off of a steep cliff disolves life. Sure, the religious order can have a belief in eternal life, but it is self-evident the members of the community no longer live to tell that story, if they choose to jump off the cliff.

Absolutely relevant truth is that we do perceive sensory input and form distinct concepts, such as "chair", "emotion", "strategy". The concepts we form comes to influence how we interact with the world. A chair tall as a tree would breach our concept of "chair as for sitting on", and instead be conceptualized as a humorous thing, an artistic installation, advertisment for a chair-shop. Climbing it and sitting on it would be for humorous effect, not for practical reason. Two different outcomes depending on how we conceptualize the sensory input. This is evident. Put a human in a room, and you will time and time again have it proved that he or she has conceptual categories and relates to them according to the personal concept. This is observable and verifiable.

With this basic absolutely relevant truth, this ontology asserts that this conceptualizing activity of the human is fundamental for understanding of, and orienting in the world. This can also be verified, in that a human will seek one outcome over another, and the conceptual model at hand is a determining factor in that.

Thus there is such a thing as conceptual accuracy, in that when the model is basis of choice, there is a perceivable response that is sensed (reality responds to actions), and this response is in alignment with what can be infered from the conceptual model. If the response is different, the model is not accurate.

To this, is added that the human has an interest in certain outcomes, and thus an interest in the acuracy of certain conceptual models. Thus, analyzing how to improve the process of constructing accurate conceptual models becomes a hihgly relevant meta goal. The better conceptual models we can create, the better the outcome will be able to match what is desired. Most people will never think of this process as a process that can be refined, but they refine it unknowingly and without the explicitly stated goal of doing so.

The structure of conceptual models is applied with the explicit goal of framing conceptual models, and defining their content, with exhausting perceptual clarity. It is a way of increase the accuracy of conceptualizing sensory input as well as making those conceptualizations more complete as to increase the awareness of possible choices and consequences.

The structure of conceptual models is not a mere alternative model of interpretation. It is not a model that can be applied. It is already in constant application by every functional human being. The structure of conceptual models, as defined here, is a clarification of what already is ongoing. Such a clarification makes a concept of that very process, and as such, just as we understand anything else, we also understand the process of understanding itself, and just as when we understand anything we also can improve our choices, it is equally true that when we understand the process of understanding, we can improve also that process, consequently improving the understanding of anything aimed to be understood.

Here it will now be shown how the what structure of conceptual models refer to is precicely an innate operational process of the human being in its conceptual interaction with sensory input. The last example will show how the human enacts the innate process of conceptual modelling, even at a level where language isn't yet applied, effectively showing that what structure of conceptual models accurately refers to something real and self-evident.

The four categories stipulated by structure of conceptual models can be simplified to four questions, which can be asked of any thing, and the progression of answering those questions sets in motion the outlining of the conceptual model the human has as basis for relating to the sensory input.

• What is this thing? (Example: Eminem's "Lose Yourself": Lyrics in a rhythmically aggressive, introspective hip-hop style.)
• What is it made of? (Example: Multi-syllabic rhymes, wordplay, emotional themes, syncopated phrasing.)
• What is it constrained by? (Example: 8-bar structure, instrumental tempo, rhyme scheme, breath control.)
• How its parts interconnected? (Example: Each line leads into the next through rhyme chaining and narrative progression, maintaining tension and thematic coherence.)

The music, as an example, can be perceived, and felt, without explicitly analyzing it by the above questions, but the perception of it still relies on a perceptual differentiation, lending the ability to recognize structure and categorize it as meaningful. The perceiver may not ask the above questions explicitly, but will sense it anyhow, even if to different degrees and in different orders:

• What is this thing? (Example: "Ah, I love this")
• What is it made of? (Example: "Are you serious? the beat, the lyrics, the flow!")
• What is it constrained by? (Example: "I love the way he plays with the words, and the beat is so smooth!")
• How its parts interconnected? (Example: "The way the rythm matches the narration makes makes the overall soundscape tell the story, not just the words, is just brilliant!")

Person A: "Why is the track so good?"
Person B: "Seriously! Just listen!"

What happens in that dialogue is that person B recognizes the song to be meaningful, but without articulating why. This must be based in perception and differentiation, or person B would not be able to differentiate it from static noise or from an ninspiring track. In the case of the Eminem track, person B knows that something different is happening in the song, because it is relying on the 8-bar technique etc, but person A may not have a way to describe why it is different from other musical tracks. At this stage person B has a non-explicit conceptual model:

• What is this thing? (Example: "Play that track again" <- there is a sense of a distinct concept being comunicated by the arrangment of all the parts of the track)
• What is it made of? (Example: "Rythmically nodding with the music and singing along momentarily" <- different parts are recognized, or there wouldnt be any aligned reaction)
• What is it constrained by? (Example: "Thinks of the music as a certain genre" <- recoznises the music stays within its genre, and expects it to stay within that genre)
• How its parts interconnected? (Example: "Gets shiverings" <- different parts connect and creates the recognition of something beyond the parts themselves)

The spontanious analysis as shown in the example above, is made into a systematic analysis by applying structure of conceptual models, for the purpose of exhausting perceptual clarity. Whereas structure of conceptual models is a way to bulid a conceptual model of anything (a song, an activity, a mental state, an object etc...), any form of analysis of sensory impressions, be it systematic or spontaneous, is always done within any of the stipulated categories. Rather than having a mere sense that one's understanding of a thing is beneficial, or having a sense it simply doesn't need to be questioned, it is actually the level of intricacy and accuracy in analysis that determines how useful one's conceputal model is in producing a beneficial outcome.

The ability of recognizing the general structure of any concept and with rigor analyze it, for complete comprehension, lends exhausting perceptual clarity. Perception's movement across the categories stipulated by structure of conceptual models is a natural movement of the necessary attempt of understanding how to interpret sensory input to nagivate for the right corresponding consequences, in a world where the wrong consequence are undesired.

Perception is here seen as not just the sensory input, but

This is also a conceptual model

A conceptual model is our understanding of something, like "football team", "game development", "thermostat", "house", "chess". The general structure of conceptual model is defined by structure of conceptual models. Thus we define the generic model of any concept. However, the structure of conceptual models is itself a conceptual model just like any other. We are to define a general pattern (structure of conceptual models), with a specific instance of that general pattern, and that specific instance will be a conceptual model. Another way to express it is that structure of conceptual models is a specific conceptual model that tries to describe what a conceptual model is like. A conceptual model can thus be made to describe its own general form. That new conceptual model we make in order to describe its own general form, is called structure of conceptual models.

It would be tempting to say that a conceptual model can describe itself, and thus claim clever self-reference. It is not correct to say it can describes itself. We can say that a conceptual model can be made, that describes the general pattern ..., then the description refers to that general pattern. But to say it describes "itself" would be to mean that it describes itself as the specific instance of that pattern, and that is not what it does. The specific instance of conceptual model can not describe itself the specific instance conceptual model, because a conceptual model refers to something beyond itself as the description, but to say it describes itself would be to say it is a description that describes its description, which is eternal recursion. The specific instance does not describe the specific instance, but we make a specific instance to describe the general pattern of any instance. We avoid having the instance descripe itself as an instance, but instead have it describe the general nature of an instance, or in other words: it’s describing what any conceptual model would look like, not describing itself as one of those conceptual models.

Why must structure of conceptual models be a conceptual model? Why must the description of the general nature of conceptual models be a conceptual model?

Because this ontology is recognizing the human being, in its attempt to understand how to relate meaningfully to sensory input, as innately, without specific instruction, categorizing and analyzing sensory input by the categories specified by structure of conceptual models. The categories of structure of conceptual models are general and apply to all conceptual models, because the human being, in its attempt to meaningfully understand sensory input, relies on these categories in all and any construction of conceptual models. Thus, the general pattern mentioned here must also be understood by the same general categories, because those categories applies in all attempts to understand, regardless of what is being understood. Understanding that happens without the application of these categories simply isn't possible. Thus, structure of conceptual models is itself framed with the general structure of conceptual models that it defines, because also it is a conceptual model.

Constitution

The structure of conceptual models consists of all possible conceptual models, because by analyzing all possible conceptual models, a general pattern is realized that captures all possible conceptual models.

A structure of conceptual models, meaning the general pattern of all conceptual models, consists of the perceiver (the reader of this text), for without it, there is no enacting of perceptual differentiation to perceptually constrain and identify the conceptual model in acordance with the structure of conceptual models.

Thus, while this same description is the same to two different perceivers, when they both read it, and enact the description by applying it, analyzing something by it, and building a conceptual model, then, each in their own case, is part of influencing the perception

Constraint

The general pattern of any conceptual model is constrained by differentiated perception. By the ability to differentiate, we can isolate one thing, recognize it as unique and different from other things. This constraint makes it possible for different categories of the general pattern to emerge. If we can not differentiate, we can not define and separate.

Emergence

Structural properties

Based in perceptual differentiation to be able to identify differences, and then to recignize the different possible categories of a general pattern that applies to all possible conceptual models; this gives the emergence of structure of conceptual models. Four categories general to all conceptual models are declared, (identity, constitution, constraint, emergence) which then becomes an analytical, fundamental, etc, structure for understanding any conceptual model.

These categories are emergent properties of the structure of conceptual models. Thus, it is here described how they emerge as part of a general pattern. It is also described what each of these general categories mean in a conceptual model.

Identity

New: Any semantic attribution is defined here in identity if we are doing conceptual definitions separated from semantic attribution. In all other categories, we work with concepts. In the category identity, all concepts are done and idenity concludes the conceptual models's identity. Thus, having all concepts outlined, it is fit to semantically attribute them to things of the real which stands apart from the conceptual domain. For example, stating that the concept checked is semantically attributed to the character sequence (x). Semantic attribution falls under identity because the conceptual model's real counterpart is part of the identity, as that counterpart is actually the complete description and expression of that which the conceptual model tries to outline.

Identity is the emergent, conclusive definition, the totality, that arises from the constitution, constraint, and emergence of a thing. Once all its generative structure is outlined, the identity is what the thing is, and thus becomes the anchor for referring to it.

The many things that map to representational medium (reality, characters in a computer etc), are viewed as identities... That is, they are sub-identeties of the identity of the conceptual model. So the identity checked maps to (x), to illustrate with the previous example.

Identity is also the public interface while constitution, constraint and emergence constitutes the private interface, to use terms of programming languages where a class has a public interface of functions and internal private ones used only by itself or by other parts in the same chain of inheritance.

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The combination of the content of constitution, constraint and emergence (defined below) leads the emergence of a category identity. This category emerges naturally merely by constitution, constraint, and emergence all being present and related. Identity is the object as it is in its completeness, with all the parts of the prior categories. This category simply reflects the totality of the conceptual model and, unlike the other three categories, does not contribute something new. It concludes what the conceptual model is. It is the declarative category that, based in the other three generative categories, declares conclusively what the specific conceptual model is. This category is influenced by perceptual differentiation, in that the perceiver is able to perceive the conceptual model as a whole as a distinct unit. This category, and consequently the other three that base it, are subject to the perceivers self-interest. The perceiver, in prioritizing things believed to be useful, will seek to construct a conceptual model that responds to what the perceiver sees as useful. Thus, the mental engagement to come to understand a certain conceptual model is influenced by the interest of the perceiver. The author of this document, for example, finds it potentially more useful at this moment to create this conceptual model that is a model of the general pattern of all possible models, rather than conceptualizing bird sounds. The authors exploration in quest of something useful, is also part of it, because not everything is planned from the start, but step by step, work on this very conceptual model called structure of conceptual models by inventing, evaluating, selecting and discarding its parts. Some conceptual models are intuitively understood by interaction with the world and need no explicit clarity, while other conceptual models are the result of rigorous thinking and rely on explicit language to convey something to complex to spontaneously understand deeply by moment to moment intuition.

Identity is the expression of a thing in its completeness. The thing itself, is an expression of itself in completeness. In the structure of conceptual models, the thing is analyzed by the way of the analytical fundamental structure, which is the structure of conceptual models. By the mentioned analysis, the identity of an object can be described as a conclusion of its constitution, constraints, and emergence, such that a perceiver has enough structur to perception to be able to recognize the thing itself as occuring in perception. This is very easy to prove. The perceiver of this text will have enough structured perception to perceive the thingness of the following (which was an example explained earlier): 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03. The perceiver can only perceive this as meaningful if the thingness of it has first been analyzed and known in some way. If analyzed by applying structure of conceptual models, the perceiver will have exhausting perceptual clarity in perceiving it. A poor analysis will yield a perception of it as thing such as "it's probably a header of some sort" and such understanding is arrived at by analyzing it against a set of prior experiences, fragments of knowledge and inference. What thing is perceived in this case, meaning, what thing comes into meaningful existence for the perceiver, depends on the perceivers values directing attention to either analyze this thing to know it, or to not do it. The knowing of things, and the degree of clarity, comes to determine the course of a perceivers experiences, where the perceiver naturally has interest in certain experiences. Knowing of certain things is required for certain jobs. Knowing of edible plants is crucial in a certain survival situation.

The analysis is not the thing, but describes the thing such that its isness can be recognized.

What the thing is in its self-contained totality. The sum total of its categories; constitution, constraint, and emergence.

It also does not refer to representational layer; that which is semantically attributed to. That would be to refer to the more concrete level.

Without the category "identity", there is just emergence as structure, but no definitive clarification that that is what the thing is. Identity clearly states what of its constitution makes its total identity. Identity thus is the totality of the structure constituting the thing.

Example: Traffic light will be our example. We define the thing that people refer to when they say I just got lucky with the trafic light still being yellow while passing. The thing being refered to here, obviously is not only the trafic light box.

Identity of trafic light: A trafic light is a device that stops trafic in accordance with trafic situation and law. It consists of a box displaying three lights, green, yellow, red. It is placed in a crossroad, towards the traffic it intends to control. It is connected to a trafic light network.

One may ask why take trafic light in everyday speech. It serves as a good example to show the everyday speach relates to a thing, and how the perception of this thing is structured by the perceiver, who, regardless any strict definition, perceives the thing trafic light to be more than the strict definition. Then, by the analysis of structure of conceptual models we form exhausting perceptual clarity, and thereby become aware of not only the trafic light box, but also its placement and the trafic light network. The perceptual clarity is useful, and here is a continuation of the example to show that: "I noticed it switched in a slightly different way today, compared to my previous experiences. That is likely because emergency veichles were driving by, but I havn't heard any, thus there is a probability there is civile cops around here, having switched the lights at nearby crossroads. All of this was able to be acheived because of exhausting perceptual clarity, achieved by analysing the everyday speach of trafic light.

As stated by this ontology, that things come into existence when known by analysis, by the way, is further very clear in case of civilian police, serving as great example. Effort is made to prevent the thing called civilian police car, from being perceptually differentiated by analysis as to establish its identity as an unit of state authority. Only those who can correctly discern its constitution and constraints can hope to succeed. For example, in old times, it was known all civilian police cars had certain patterns in the numbering of the licence plates. When designing the "civile police car", the designer in question may not have had perceptual clarity enough to consider the default number plate creation a constraint of the thing civil police car, and thus had no awareness of how the plates would end up being printed in a pattern as a consequence of the default settings in the ordering process.

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A conceptual model is constrained by its identity. Identity is an emergence, that becomes a constraint.

At the core, we have the recognition of difference in perception. How perception is differentiated (meaning where we percieve the boundaries of a thing) is defined by its identity. Example: One may be surprised many more expensive speakers do not come with cables or even amplifiers. That is because in the domain of high end speakers another ontology presides, where the concept of a speaker is limited to the actual speaker unit, whereas in the budget market, a speaker is understood as "that which makes sound" which then implies a whole set of common things such as sound cables and power adapters. A thing here, thus is understood and delineated by an describable idea. If you ask the dealer in a high end shop about the cables, he would describe the idea that the speaker unit is just the speakers and not the sound cables. In a structure of conceptual models, the identity is the highest delimiting factor, which is also contained within the conceptual model, and thus the thing contains its own boundaries. (It is thus self-delimiting).

It is the act of differentiating perception to isolate the thing by its identity and locate the defining parts (constitution, constraint and emergence) of its identity within itself, (rather than putting the identity outside the thing), that makes the identity self-emerge.

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Like the other categories, this one also relies on perceptual differentiation.

Constitution

Perception of difference allows for unique things to be percieved. Before any structure is seen in any thing, these are just things that are different from each other. Because we need useful things, we recognize uniqueness among things and ascribe different meaning to different things. We deem things meaningful, meaning the thing aligns in such a way it produces outcome deemed useful. Constitution are the things that a thing must consist of for it to be able to align with its identity.

The color green is not red. We know there is a difference, but still, at this stage, there is no meaning ascribed to the things themselves. We have not yet linked them fully with a identity, just recognized that there are different things, and that we have selected some things to be listed listed under constitution that later in emergence will show to be meaningful to the identity.

Example: A trafic light has green, yellow, red. It constitutes of a box displaying these lights. Trafic light (in our particular use of the word) also consists of a trafic light network.

Constraint

Similarly to how the category constitution emerges from perception of difference, also the category constraint emerges from the perception of difference. This category also emerges in relation to the identity of the conceptual model which necessiates certain constraints, just as it necessiates a certain consitution.

Rules governing the constitution. Example: Constitution: green and red. Constraint: can not be a combination of the two colors.

Can constrain both constitution and emergence, thus full power in shaping the identity.

Continuing the trafic light example: Constraints are now put on the constituting colors:

The trafic light must be separated from a disco light (especially when some disco props are made to imitate the look of traffic lights). Thus, placement is a constraint of trafic light, if by the conceptual model trafic light, we mean a device that actually stops trafic (not merely provide light). Constraints:

• There can only be 3 colors.
• Only one color can be lit at a time, except for yellow, which can be lit with red.
• Must be placed in a crossroad, towards the trafic it intends to control.
• Each light must be a certain luminosity.
• Must be connected with a network that can control the lights. (this constraint is put here, becasue we, later in identity define "trafic light" as a thing that stops trafic in accordance with trafic situation and law)

Emergence

Emergence is the property or behaviour that arises from the relations between the constitution and constraints. There can be many emergences...

This category also relies on perceptual differentiation, as we are discerning and perceiving the emergent properties and behaviours the same way we do for parts of the constitution and constraints.

This category emerges in any conceptual model, because if a conceptual model contains constitution and constraint, their mere presence, as defined in these two prior categories, will create relations giving rise to emergent behaviour or emergent properties.

The trafic light example:

• Connected to the trafic light network, and placed correctly, the trafic light unit will light up the appropriate color and display it in the direction of the trafic to be controlled.

Inheritance

At the perceptual level, inheritance does not exist. There is no abstract substance called structure of conceptual models that conceptual models derive from. Every individual conceptual model simply just contain the same general structure. Each conceptual model (and especially the sensory reality the model may refer to) stands on its own, without any inheritance. The general pattern of structure of conceptual models naturally emerge in all conceptual models being formed, not as a result of an existing abstract force that would be inherited from, but from the human's way of cognitively relating to sensory input for the purpose of understanding what is useful for the necessity of navigating the world of consequences. However, at the level of conceptual modeling, we can easily extend our conceptual modeling capability by apply inheritance. This opens another dimension of structure of conceptual models where the structure instead act as modeling tool to analyze a set of concepts and their relations, meaning how one concept inherits features of another. To do this, this ontology states that structure of conceptual models is the parent of all conceptual models. Structure of conceptual models is self-declared in every conceptual model.

What allows for inheritance is surprisingly not a new feature of structure of conceptual models, but instead applying that very same concept, to form a conceptual model that simply contains inheritance. Remember, structure of conceptual models is the general structure of all conceptual models. So:

Object A
...
Object B
Constitutes: Object A
Constraints: Adopts all features of Object A, can override and modify them.
Emergence: Object B is a more specific version of Object A, with all the features of Object A, but with some modifications.

Object X
...

Object C
Constitutes: Object B, Object X
Constraints: Adopts all features of Object B and Object X, ...

Single and multiple inheritance is possible. Anything is possible. It depends on how we define the conceptual model doing the inheritance.

The capacity of inheritance is not specifically integral to the structure of conceptual models, but is completely possible due to the fact that structure of conceptual models is a general generative and declarative structure, capable of generating emergent behaviour of inheritance and declare such as part of the focal object's identity. Thus our inheritance never needs to go down at the level of fundamental perception and argue its existence there (in fact, it can not exist there, as no concept is bound to another, but are only bound as far as the perceiver models the concept to be so).
Thus:

• Perceptual level – where each conceptual model is self-contained, emergent from differentiated perception, and not “inherited” from anything.
• Modeling level – where inheritance is a declared modeling strategy, not an ontological structure of reality.

Note: a chain of inheritance is not really a chain of several objects, it is one single conceptual model having all its inherited objects inside itself as part of its constitution, and defining the constraints of how to derive properties from those. Only when viewing the modeling, with several objects outlined on a drawing board, does it look like they are many. Wherever in the chain of inheritance on the drawing board the perceiver chooses to focus, that becomes a complete conceptual model in its own right, the moment the perceiver understands exactly that part. The perceiver always reframes whatever is focused on, as a complete conceptual model, and if it is experienced its a unfinished model, then the perceiver simply frames it as the complete conceptual model of unfinished conceptual model (but likely never states that explicitly, as in modeling, the goal is to arrive at perceived completeness, which by the way continues to be improved on and adapted). The perceiver never perceives a whole chain of parts, but moves reframes whatever is focused on into a complete conceptual model. So if looking at the topmost one, which is the structure of conceptual models, then the perceiver simply perceives the complete conceptual model of that, excluding any other parts that are outlined on the drawing table to derive from it. If the perceiver is in fact looking at the table with all its parts, then the conceptual model becomes simply drawing table with many parts outlining conceptual modelling relations.

Uniqueness

A thing must be differentiable. A thing can only exist if it is differentiated from others (from this follows that structure of conceptual models is a differentiable, and if so, it implies a unique content, and it implies a boundary by which it can be separated from what it is not, thus implying an inside, and implying identity, and identity in turn implies differentiated perception of its inside, to be able to perceive its uniqueness, which must be there, if the thing is able to be separated from other things. The uniqueness of a thing can be analyzed and knonw, because there is differentiated perception. Differentiation is the fundamental constraining factor.)

The act of putting constraints on the constitution of a thing, is the act of structuring (?) perception of the constitution of the thing, which naturally yields emergent structures and behaviours, which inherently becomes part of the thing.

The inside of the thing can be analyzed to have constitutents, and contraints, naturally, because it muust have content that differentiates it from other things. The category constitution and constraint thus are emergent categories of a things identity (that it has an unique inside) and the perceivers process of differentiation to perceive the constitution and constraints of the inside.

Thus, of the constraint of differentiated perception, the emergent categories of constitution and constraint are derived. The category emergence is derived as a consequence of the analysis of constitution and constraint, and all in its totality constitutes the category identity.

Categories are not defined, but declared

A structure of conceptual models, or any conceptual model, does not consists of a structure of conceptual models in the sense it must be imported in its constitution. It is because the categories declared by structure of conceptual models emerges as self-evident from the process of differentiating perception which all meaningful conceptual models are constrained by. Any conceptual model thus have all it need to self-organize these categories, and this self-organizing is exactly what structure of conceptual models describe. Thus, structure of conceptual models does not define a set of categories, it merely show how these, and exactly these, inveitabely emerges in any meaningful understanding; in any conceptual model. The categories of structure of conceptual models are not defined because they sound fitting, but they emerge as consequence of the fundamental constitution and constraint that is part of any conceptual model, and thus are rather declared.

No trancendental entity

Because structure of conceptual models describes the general pattern of all conceptual models, the perceiver is consequently part of any conceptual models being perceived. The percevier should not believe there is a conceptual model somewhere external to the perceiver, that exists independently, that several people tap in to. The perceiver is part of constructing the conceptual model it perceives, in the sense the model is formed based in the perceivers selection process of what is useful to the perceiver. An accurate conceptual model of the meaning of bird songs is not useful or interesting to most people, and thus they remain with the most generic conceptual model of bird song, such as "sound relating to birds, possibly several different birds".

• It can only be reflected in a conceptual model. The structure of conceptual models is not a trancendental entity, that, if somehow all other conceptual models were to vanish, it would remain as "pure substance", "prior to any thing", "from which all things are made". A structure of conceptual models, contrary to that, is, wherever there is a conceptual model. All conceptual models reflects the structure described by structure of conceptual models. A structure of conceptual models is not in addition to a conceptual model, like logos describing humans. It is not a substrata (for example "pure consciousness"). A structure of conceptual models is the model of any conceptual model.

Self-aserting

(Perhaps the most impoprant emergent feature of a thing): All parts are aligned to support the identity. This is implicit, as the identity is integral, and a identity can not be integral to a thing that does not honor it. The boundary of a thing (how a thing is differentiated from other things) is in its totality defined by identity. Things that do not align with the identity, are simply outside the thing, not part of the thing. Remember, a thing is self-evident. It does not need a description on a paper, like a blueprint. It itself is its own description. A thing is self-evident, in that its existence tells what it is (and it can not be wrong or incomplete about it). Any analysis of a thing, thus is evidently correct if it aligns with the self-evident thing. It will be evident if a part of a thing relates to the identity or not. In describing a thing, we can do conceptual errors of putting non-identityful aspects in the description, but that is just a bad description, and will simply not have any relation to any thing in reality, other than the bad description itself being a thing that is a bad description.

Sum

For any thing to be perceived, there needs to be perception of difference. Based in percieving difference, we recognize a thing, any thing, has properties, , identity, etc. Thus, several dimensions of a thing are outlined. This differentiation among aspects of a thing is possible, because the fundamental constraint of any object, is differentiation. By differentiating things of perception, a set of aspects, or dimensions, or properties, of a thing can be perceived.

The relations between these the categories constitution and constraint of the thing, gives rise to certain emergent features of the thing, which comes to further define the thing and comprise its category of identity.

To call specific things into perception, they must be differentiated for their unique attributes, and the structure of conceptual models serves as a way to structure perception of any thing to frame the perception of its specific content with exhausting perceptual clarity, which is achieved by structuring perception to frame its specific content in all its parts in all dimensions, not just a few. The degree of a specific hammer's usefullness is better understood if the totality of what makes the hammer is understood. Knowing it is a hammer of metal and not rubber makes a difference if we are to adjust a sensitive material with it. Reviewing the constitution, constraint and emergent features also reveals more of its identity and thus its degree of usefulness. The thing is also containing the perceiver as a constraining factor, meaning the emergence of the specific identity of the thing, is shaped by the perceivers values. Sure, a hammer exists as it is regardless of the perceivers values, but it exist only as meaningful, or useful in other words, to the perceiver, depening on the values of the perceiver. The evidence of this is that the following is not perceived as a something of value to most people: 1f 8b 08 00 00 00 00 00 00 03, but with the right conceptual model, the thing will be perceived. For example: Identity: A header of a compression file format specifying its identity as Gzip, with with associated metadata such as compression method, used to correctly parse the compressed data. Constitutes: Sequential series of binary data. Constraint: the header must come first. Emergence: the rest of the data can be parsed.

In the same way, the conceptual model is recognized to be related to other distinct conceptual models, which are perceived by the same capability of perception of difference, is able to discern the conceptual model being part of the constitution of the thing. The constitution is also seen as integral to the conceptual model. One could argue the parts of a speaker are not integral to it (they are different external things, just put in the same speaker box, and they all have their own blueprints and can even be sold separately). However, the boundary of a conceptual model (how we differentiate it from other things) is determined here by the integral identity of the conceptual model. All conceptual models in the constitution needed for the identity are considered integral to the thing. The thing specifies all of its parts in constitutoin and a conceptual model is thus self-constituting. Note that if we change the identity of the speaker to exclude the cable, the prior three categories must adapt, removing the cables.

X properties

Self-evident

A thing is the description of itself. The description of a thing is not external to itself. A blueprint would be a thing (it is a blueprint) that describes another thing. However, both the blueprint and the building it describes are two separate things, both having their own thingness. The thingness is the complete description of the object. Because all things have thingness, all objects are their own description. They are self-evident. They do not need anything to describe them because their very composition is the highest level description of what they are. Just like a person may only understand half of a text description, a person may also only understand half of a thing while observing the thing.

It follows that structure of conceptual models itself, that which this text is describing, does not need these words. It exists in its completeness regardless. It is a claim that what this text describes, in fact does exist. This description could as well be false in the sense that it does not refer to anything real. An example of a false description: "Purple consists of the electromagnetic waves. Constraint: wavelength of 1000 nanometers" (it actually has wavelength of ~380 to 450 nm). In a sense, we never perceive the thing firsthand, but always by a layer of understanding, a cognitive model of the thing, that refers to presumed things in the world. We act not in direct relation to the thing itself, but first in relation to the cognitive model of the thing, and indirectly, trough such a model, do we relate to the thing. Our cognitive model is what informs our actions, and we correct or cognitive model by questioning the cognitive model if the result of our actions are not the expected as could be inferred from our cognitive model. Why do we interact indirectly with the real in this way? Because direct perception of the real would necessiate perception of its totality. Total perception would not filter things for usefulness, and thus would leave us vunerable to dangers such as falling off a cliff. Cognition creates perception itself is finetuned to perceive things are useful to us, and to perceive them in increasingly more useful ways. Steep cliff thus is a thing where gravity, distance, direction, surface terrain all are fragments of the pressumed real, used to conceptually model the thing steep cliff, which we then relate toand successfully prevent a certain sequence of felt consequences. Here, it is also seen that the perceiver is involved in shaping the concept of the thing steep cliff. No, the perceiver doesn't shape the real by his conceptual model, as the steep cliff remains regardless the thought of it. The perceiver shapes the very concept of it by including certain fragments of the real such as gravity, distance etc. A value system underlies the selection process for how the concept is constructed, which is based in the perceivers interest. Thus, the conceptual model of the world, by which the perceiver interprets the real is created in conjuction with the perceiver's self-interest. The created concept becomes the thing to the perceiver. The real simply is not directly meaningful to the perceiver. Only the concept is directly meaningful, because it is a shaped interpretation of the real, useful and necessary to the perceiver. The preceiver does not really know there is any real, but assumes so, because there is a predictability of the consequences of choices based on conceptual models. The perceiver assumes there is a real that is vast, complete, and present, because conceptual models consistently creates predictable outcom when acted in relation to. This ontology does not care to claim there is or is not a real. It claim that the perceiver can not know it, but knows only conceptual models of its own making, and knows the felt effects of basing choice on them. Simultaneously, the preceiver is in direct contact with the real, but not as understanding it, but by feeling it. The feeling is the direct experience, and the understanding of it is the concept the perceiver constructs based in what is felt. Feel does not refer to emotions, but to anything that impresses the senses (sensing). The reason the perceiver constructs an understanding of what is felt, is because if, instead, feeling instantly goes to action, the perceiver would be deceived and would severely increase the probability of being terminated. A child may be able to sense Santa Clause is real, because he is standing right there at Christmas. The child has more sensing than conceptual modelling and thus acts on appearance.

A note on the child's realization of the deception of Santa Clause: The parents introduces deception into the comfort zone of the child, where, to the child, things are exactly as they appear. Sensation can be trusted to reflect reality as it is. When the deception of Santa Clause is realized, the child has to divorce itself from sensation as reliable source, and start understand things, like Santa Clause, as conceptual models being more complex than the mere felt appearances. Felt appearances of the real now become constitutents of a conceptual model (within the structure of conceptual models), which the now older child primarily relates to, and thus, and the emergent conceptual identity of Santa Clause as "roleplay" now takes precedence, whereas the child relates to the appearance, not by astonishment, but by perhaps scorn, like ("I know who you are"). The beneficial action of not relating to Santa Clause as real is a result, not of relating to mere appearance of the real but by primarily relating to the conceptual model. Santa Clause is self-evident as a deception, because the presence of Santa Clause contains all that is needed to fully understand it. The thing itself is self-evident, and doesn't need our description, but the perceiver needs the description (a good conceptual model) to recognize the self-evident nature of the thing.

There is no such thing as "perceiving reality as it is", and especially not by removing conceptual models and only attend to sensation. There are good and bad conceptual models, but there is no reality beneath all models that can meaningfully be concieved of in absense of concepts. Focusing only on sensation, however, can increase the awareness of the feedback from the assumed real. This feedback comes to inform the construction of conceptual models.

The perceiver sources the real for fragments to build conceptual models lending predictable favourable outcome when related to as basis for choice and action.

That means: all things can be seen to represent the structure described here, regardless if this structure is described here or not.

Structured perception determines a things existence

A thing exists when it is percieved. If not percieved, we can not know it exists. An object in the other room does not exist, but the sense it does is based on an assumption, perhaps because we were in the room 1 minute earlier. A thing comes into existence and goes out of existence, as it comes and goes out of perception. We can not percieve that it does exist, while we do not percieve it. (There is only things as perceived).

This refers to the felt appearance of the real of the thing. We know there is a felt appearance, when we perceive it. We do not know if that felt appearance is still there, if we do not somehow feel it (percieve it).

Self-creating/defining

A thing, as a particular thing, is perceived based on perception being structured to percieve it. Perception being structured differently, yields a different thing being percieved. The thing is to the perceiver as it is perceived, but its basis in the real is what it self-evidently is. The perceiver may not construct an understanding of the thing that correctly relates to the real. An "inacurate" perception would be its own thing (its own understanding). Those are things, conceptual models, in that they come to be influential as exactly those things to person perceiving them. Based on perception, the thing is determined useful to a degree, and the person will make choice, attempting the better outcome as determined by the persons idea of what is desirable.

A thing comes into perception of the perceiver as to the degree it is useful, and comes into perception in an useful way (preferably). Therefore, not all things matter. This ontology is not concerned with for example a distant star you do not perceive, because if that would matter, then every posibility in eternity would matter. A distant star could matter to an astronomer, because he or she can perceive it and deems it useful to study).

Thing properties

Note: structure of conceptual models does not make metaphysical claims about reality-as-such. It describes how things are formed in differentiated perception, and how these structures emerge in relation to the perceiver. Then, a thing is always perceived differentiated, discerned. A non-differentiated, non-discerned thing can not be perceived. The constraint is that all things are based in differentiated perception. Perception includes both sensations and concepts. Sensation is directly knonw, or one would not have an incentive to remove the hand from a hot stove. Conceptual models are also directly known, as such, meaning it is the conceptual model that is directly known, as it impresses cognition, but what the concept refers to, is not directly known, only indirectly trough the concept. A cellphone is a conceptual model and the item it refers to is not directly known. However, the weight of the cellphone can be directly sensed and thus directly known. Material is directly known, but what that material means to us, is only a conceptual model that refers to a thing which we deem have the identity and meaning of the conceptual model. Gravity is not known as "gravity". The concept "gravity" is not directly known. However, the pull of the earth can be felt and directly known regardless of our language, thoughts and concepts.

Because of differentiated perception being the constraint of any thing:

• A thing is what it is not.
  • The color blue is not red, not tall, not loud, not magnetic. When we remove all things we know blue is not, then we see that what remains is the quality of blue. Thus, the color blue is blue.
• A thing is not non-existing, because a non-existing thing is different from the thing. Blue can not be blue, if blue does not exist.
• A thing is immutable, in that it can not change and still be the same thing.
• A thing is a particular thing, it is not another thing.
• A things existence is contingent on perception. If a thing is not perceived, it is not a thing. If a thing is perceived, it is a thing.
• A thing must have an identity.

Meta

In short: The meta category is not part of the conceptual model — it is a scaffold for perceiving it clearly.

No attempts are made to make it ontologicaly integral to the core model of structure of conceptual models, such that it is part of its constitution or emerges. Neither is it existing outside the ontological reality defined by structure of conceptual models. Remember,

• there is no conceptual model outside this ontology,
• the active cognitive process of interpreting sensory input, for the necessary purpose of meaning-making, reflects the structure of conceptual models,
• there is no meaningful interaction with sensory input (the presumed real) without conceptual models, no matter how unconscious those models are.

Thus, the meta category can not somehow exist outside the ontological reality of structure of conceptual models.

The meta category is not part of the conceptual model, but it must exist on the same terms as any other conceptual model. It is not ontologicaly integral to the core structure of all conceptual models, but it is ontologically real in the sense the meta category is perceived by the same process of analytical application of structure of conceptual models, regardless of how unconscious that analytical process is. The rationalization is further clarified below.

Definition

The meta category is a pseudo-category that is not emergent of perceptual differentiation and the percievers activity of such. The meta category is purely for sake of conceptual modeling, in that, when structure of conceptual models is applied to model a concept by analyzing sensory input and writing the conceptual model in a text-file, the meta category adds what is needed to help model the concept. It can be for example a table of contents, or a definition of syntax used to describe parts that makes up the conceptual model. The meta category consists of things that are of use for understanding the conceptual model, and not part of the conceptual model itself. The meta category supplies what is helpful for rendering the conceptual model in the perceiver's understanding.

Placement and content

The meta category is marked as such in any way deemed suitable to distinguish it from the non-meta content. It is suggested to simply create a level two heading titled "Meta" and for example place it at the beginning. However, it can be placed anywhere deemed suitable in the way deemed suitable.

It can hold for example table of contents, syntax definition needed to understand the conceptual model, etc.

The meta category can also be used to hold appendix. Template metadata (versioning, authorship, etc.), change log, todo, footnotes etc.

The meta information can be included in other ways to if no explicit meta category is used, just as any category can be renamed and still keep the essence of the structure of conceptual models. Different use cases may prefer different "resolution" of the formal structure, or different levels of explicit expression of it.

Ontological rationalization

Rationalization of the meta category: to ontologicly explain the meta category, the very text itself describing a conceptual model undergoes the same spontaneous perceptual differentiation that humans innately preform when understanding anything. The text-description appears to the human as sensory input. It is already conceptualized as a "file" on a "computer" with a familiar language. Then the content is conceptualized as a textfile in the format of structure of conceptual models with meta category. Thus, the human has a higher level conceptual model, built spontaneously by the mind, whereby he or she knows to separate the meta category from the conceptual model being described, and knows to use the content of the meta category to understand and conceptually modell the specific conceptual model that the file describes. The perceiver interacts with the meta category to understand the conceptual model. In a sense, the meta category is no different from any other tool used to help understand the conceptual model, for example a text-magnifying tool in the text editor to help reading ability, or another example would be color theme for eye comfort. The meta category can for example contain a table of contents. However, the category can also contain such things that are more integrated with the description of the model itself: things like an invented syntax used specifically to describe the conceptual model. The meta category is instrumental in understanding the conceptual model in question.